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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the links between exports, export destinations and skill utilization by firms. We
identify two mechanisms behind these links, which we integrate into a unified theory of export destinations
and skills. First, exporting to high-income countries with higher valuation for quality leads to quality
upgrades that are skill-intensive (Verhoogen, 2008). Second, exporting requires services such as distribution,
transportation, and advertising, activities that are also intensive in skilled labor (Matsuyama, 2007).
Depending on the characteristics of the source country (such as income, language), the theories suggest
a skill-bias in export destinations: firms that export to high-income destinations hire more skills and
pay higher wages than firms that export to middle-income countries or that sell domestically. We test
the theory using a panel of Argentine manufacturing firms. The data cover the period 1998-2000 and
span the Brazilian currency devaluation of 1999. We use the exogenous changes in exports and export
destinations brought about by this devaluation in a major export partner to identify the causal effect
of exporting and of exporting to high-income countries on skill utilization. We find that Argentine
firms exporting to high-income countries hired a higher proportion of skilled workers and paid higher
average wages than other exporters (to non high-income countries) and domestic firms. Instead, we
cannot identify any causal effect of exporting per se on skill utilization.
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In this paper, we investigate whether the destination of exports, rather than the mere act of
exporting, aects rm behavior. While it has already been established that exporters outperform
non-exporters (they pay higher wages, they are more productive, and they are larger), the causal
eect of exporting is less evident. Often, the evidence supports a story of selection. Exporting
allows rms to take advantage of their inherent good attributes, such as productivity, but the act
of exporting itself does not necessarily aect rm behavior (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard
and Jensen, 1999; Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott, 2007; Clerides, Lach, and Tybout, 1998).
In other instances, exporting does aect behavior. The evidence in Bustos (2011) and the theory of
Matsuyama (2007) suggest that what matters is exporting per se, with exporters adopting better
technologies and utilizing more skilled labor. In turn, the evidence in Bastos and Silva (2010),
G org, Halpern and Murak ozy (2010), Hummels and Skiba (2004), Manova and Zhang (2011),
Martin (2010) and Verhoogen (2008) suggests that certain features of the country of destination,
such as income, quality valuation, distance, and transport costs, aect rm decisions. Our analysis
shows that exporting to high-income destinations aects rm behavior, but exporting does not.
We elaborate upon a theory of how exports and export destinations aect the utilization of
skilled labor, and we document those features using a panel of manufacturing rms from Argentina.
Traditional theories of international trade often take a relatively simple view of the production
process in which the production of goods is carried out by combining factors (labor, capital) and
a technology. Recent trade models, including Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Matsuyama (2007),
Verhoogen (2008), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), internalize some of the complexities of
modern production processes by assuming that the production of goods comprises the combination
of activities such as various manufacturing tasks, marketing, distribution, foreign trade activities
and exporting services. These tasks dier in their skill intensity so that the act of \exporting"
becomes a skilled intensive activity, even when the act of \manufacturing" is unskilled-intensive.
Moreover, we argue here that the act of \exporting to high-income destinations" may require
technologies and tasks that are yet more skill-intensive. In consequence, economies that trade with
high-income countries will utilize relatively higher levels of skills and will pay higher wages than
economies that are either closed or specialized in trade with middle- or low-income countries.
There are various reasons why the act of exporting by developing countries may demand skills,
even when the production process is relatively intensive in the use of unskilled labor. A leading
2recent theory is provided by Verhoogen (2008), who develops a model where exporting allows
for quality upgrading|an activity that demands skilled labor. This idea can be extended to
accommodate models where vertical dierentiation includes associated services such as labeling or
customer support and where the provision of these services is a skilled-intensive activity. Note
that exporting per se does not necessarily lead to quality upgrading. Firms in a country like
Argentina|the target country in the empirical work|may choose to produce the same level of
quality to sell internally than to sell to neighboring markets like Brazil. By contrast, exporting to
high-income countries with higher valuation for quality (e.g., the U.S.) does lead to higher quality
products and to higher skill use. In other words, our claim is that \where you export" matters.1
Matsuyama (2007) proposes another reason why export destinations may require varying levels
of skills. He advances a model of \skilled-bias globalization" in which international trade activities
use resources and are relatively skilled-intensive. These activities, which include international
marketing and commercialization, transportation and distribution, and advertising (as in Arkolakis,
2010), require expertise in international businesses, languages, foreign technologies, and in the social
idiosyncrasies of foreign markets. In Matsuyama's model, the technologies to supply goods depend
on whether rms sell domestically or abroad. In our setting, we allow for a modied Matsuyama
argument where the technology to supply goods may also depend on the destination of exports: for
a country like Argentina, the activities needed to access high-income countries may require more
skills than those activities needed to access neighboring markets.
We test our hypothesis using a panel of Argentine manufacturing rms, the Encuesta Nacional
Industrial, ENI (National Industrial Survey). The surveys include information on sales, wage bill,
employment of production and non-production workers, and other general characteristics of the
rms (such as industry aliation, type of ownership, and plant age). Using condential information,
we matched the rms in the ENI with administrative customs data available for 1998, 1999 and
2000. The result is a combination of typical information from industrial surveys with information
on export values and export destinations at the rm level. In other words, we know, for each rm
in the panel, whether the rm exported, how much it exported, and where it exported to.
Our 1998-2000 data span the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, which provides a nice setting for
identication. Brazil is a major trade partner of Argentina, and the 1999 devaluation had a large
1Our theory is thus related to the argument in Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007), who claim that \what you
export" matters. If goods are dierentiated by export destination, then \what you export" and \where you export"
are clearly interrelated.
3impact on Argentine exporters. The Brazilian devaluation generated exogenous variability in the
export destinations of Argentine rms as some switched Brazil for high-income countries (and
also the domestic market). We use an instrumental variables strategy to exploit these exogenous
changes to identify the role of exports and of the composition of exports in the determination of
the skill composition of employment in Argentine rms. Moreover, since we work with a panel, we
can match, for a given rm, the behavioral changes in terms of skill utilization with the exogenous
changes in its export composition induced by the Brazilian devaluation.
We nd that, for Argentine rms, exporting to high-income countries matters, but exporting
per se does not. Firms that tend to export more to high-income countries use more skills and
pay higher average wages than rms that do not export at all or export instead to middle-income
countries. The reason is that the local markets in Argentina are similar to the export markets
in middle-income countries and thus it is only possible to observe dierences in outcomes for
rms exporting to high-income countries. Further, we use the information on exports to dierent
destinations to explore which features of those destinations are likely to drive the results. Our
evidence strongly supports the quality valuation story of Verhoogen (2008). We instead only nd
partial support for the modied Matsuyama (2007) required-services argument.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we integrate the various
channels linking the choice of skilled labor utilization with the act of exporting and with the act
of exporting to high-income destinations. In Sections 3 and 4 we discuss our empirical model and
identication strategy, and we present the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 An Integrated Theory of Skills and Export Destinations
This section presents a simple partial equilibrium model that integrates two broad mechanisms
linking exports and skill composition at the rm-level: quality valuation (Verhoogen, 2008) and
exporting-related required services (Matsuyama, 2007).2 We rst describe the demand side and
the structure of production in a generic market. We then discuss how these mechanisms depend
on features of the export destinations.
2The literature on trade and quality is growing steadily. See Manasse and Turrini (2001), Hummels and Skiba
(2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak (2006), Verhoogen (2008), Hallak (2010), Hallak and Schott (2011),
Hallak and Sivadasan (2009), Khandelwal (2010), Kugler and Vergoohen (2011), and Fajgelbaum, Grossman and
Helpman (2009), among others. Our model combines elements from various papers. Matsuyama (2007) was the rst
to highlight the role of activities that are inherent to the act of exporting in the theory of trade and comparative
advantage.
4Let products be both horizontally and vertically dierentiated and allow preferences to be
non-homothetic in order to capture the notion that high income countries value high quality goods
more than low income countries.3 We adopt a multinomial logit utility specication as in Verhoogen
(2008) where consumers in high income countries have a lower marginal utility of income and thus
are willing to pay a premium for a good of a given quality. The utility that consumer i in country
of destination c derives from purchasing product j depends on a vertical dierentiation parameter,
denoted by , its price, denoted by p, and a random deviation that follows a type-I extreme value















where Mc is the number of consumers in country c, or market size, and Wc is an index that





z), where Zc is the set of available products). The parameter c can be interpreted as the
marginal utility of income, or the inverse valuation of quality; it dictates the relative importance
of  and p in the utility function. Thus, 1=c captures quality valuation, as in Verhoogen (2008).4
On the supply side, there are J monopolistically-competitive rms in the source country, each
producing a dierentiated product.5 Each rm can ship its product to multiple destinations.
Exporting to destination c has an associated xed cost given by Fc. Firms can choose the level
3For simplicity, we do not consider dierences in preferences among consumers in a given country.
4The utility function in (1) can be derived from a utility function dened over the vertically dierentiated products
and a homogeneous numeraire product. Utility from choosing variety j and consuming y
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with respect to the `outside option' does not aect the choice probabilities. Notice that the primitive preferences
are the same across countries of destination and that the parameter 
c varies across countries through dierences in
income. We assume that 
c is not aected by changes in income induced by exchange rate movements.
5We assume that the number of rms is xed, as in Chaney (2008) and Arkolakis (2010). Arkolakis, Demidova,
Klenow, and Rodriguez-Clare (2008) show that this assumption yields the same results as free entry in the model of
Melitz (2003).
5of vertical dierentiation of their products and, moreover, they can tailor the level of vertical
dierentiation to each specic country of destination (thus, c
j is indexed by j and c). Intuitively,
vertical dierentiation involves physical product quality, packaging, and services such as advertising,
customer support, and timely delivery, which can be dierentiated by country of destination. By
choosing the level of vertical dierentiation, rms shift their residual demands. The degree to which
a residual demand is shifted depends on the quality valuation parameter 1=c, which gives rms
the option to provide more vertical dierentiation in destinations where it is valued more highly.
We assume that reaching consumers in country c involves a second set of services and tasks,
such as marketing research, communication with clients or intermediaries, transportation, and
distribution. These services, akin to the variable costs of Matsuyama (2007), are related to the
exporting technology and do not aect the value that consumers attach to a rm's product; nor is
its level chosen by the rms. We refer to these services as \required services," and we denote the
level of required services to reach consumers in country c by c. Note that in Matsuyama (2007),
 is independent of the destination market. Our modied Matsuyama hypothesis allows instead
for dierences in the level of required services by country of destination. These dierences arise
from geographic location (through transportation costs), from cultural and linguistic distance, from
dierences in social norms and idiosyncracies, and from dierences in business models. A similar
idea emerges from the case studies of Argentine exporters in Artopoulos, Friel and Hallak (2011).
They identify \embeddedness" in foreign businesses as a prerequisite for successful exporting to
developed countries. Being familiar (embedded) with business and social practices in the destination
country creates intrinsic knowledge about the destination markets (such as detailed information
about consumer trends or about the main features of dierent distributors) and this knowledge is
essential for exporting.
To study the relationship between the provision of vertical dierentiation and required services,
the decision to export to dierent destinations, and the skill composition of employment, we adopt
several simplifying assumptions. First, labor is the only input and there are two types of workers,
skilled and unskilled. Second, wages are xed (e.g., they are determined in the production of larger
homogeneous goods sectors). Without loss of generality we normalize the wage of unskilled workers
to one and denote the wage of skilled workers by w. Third, we assume that there is no direct
substitution (except through the choice of quality) between skilled and unskilled workers. Finally,
we assume that the provision of vertical dierentiation and of required services is, as in Verhoogen
6(2008) and Matsuyama (2007), intensive in skilled workers. To formalize this, we assume that
delivering one unit of nal product of quality c
j to country c requires aj units of unskilled labor
and bj((c
j) +c) units of skilled labor, with  > 1.6 Note that since parameters aj and bj vary at
the rm level, we allow for two sources of rm heterogeneity as in Hallak and Sivadasan (2009).
For each destination, rms choose prices pc
j and the level of vertical dierentiation c
j to maximize
prots given by c
j = [pc
j  aj  bj(c +(c
j))w]xc(pc
j;c
j) Fc.7 The solutions for pc
j and c
j, which
are independent across destinations, are given by
(3) pc

















The vertical dierentiation parameter c
j is decreasing in the marginal utility of income (c)|rms
choose to provide a higher level of quality when it is valued more highly |and it is independent of
c
j. Price is increasing in c, reecting the higher unit cost implied by a higher c, and decreasing in
c, reecting both the higher unit cost implied by the higher optimal quality and the fact that rms
can extract more surplus from consumers when they are willing to pay more for their products.
Once prices and quality are chosen, rms compare variable prots with the destination-specic
xed costs and decide which markets to enter.
Given the optimal solution for price and vertical dierentiation, the relative demand for skilled















Equation (5) delivers the basic relationship between export destinations and skill utilization that
6To preserve Matsuyama's Ricardian features, we assume linearity in the provision of required services, such as
transportation costs, while decreasing returns to scale in the provision of vertical dierentiation, such as quality of
service. This latter assumption reects the fact that shifting the demand function becomes increasingly more dicult
as quality increases. From a technical standpoint, this assumption is needed because 
c
j is a choice variable. The skilled




. This alternative assumption yields very similar predictions.
At the same time, we assume that the cost of providing vertical dierentiation in one market is independent of the
level of vertical dierentiation provided by the same rm in other markets. This assumption is in line with the
constant marginal cost assumption in the number of units and with independence of preferences across markets (by
which shifting the demand function in one country does not become increasingly more costly as demand is shifted in
other markets).
7The monopolistic competition assumption implies that rms do not aect the index W
c.
7stems from our theory. Since rms need to provide the required services c because of technological
requirements, and the provision of these services is skilled intensive, Sc
j is increasing in c. Since
rms provide services to increase quality when these services are more valuable to consumers, and
since quality provision is intensive in skills, Sc
j is decreasing in c. Dierences in c and c across
destinations create dierences in the skill utilization of domestic rms.
To study the role of these dierences in c and c, we work with three markets: the domestic
market (D), high income destinations (H), and low income destinations (L). We start with the
quality valuation mechanism (Verhoogen, 2008). The marginal utility of income is decreasing in
income, and thus is lower in the high-income market than in the low-income market (H < L).
In equilibrium, rms choose a higher level of vertical dierentiation in high income destinations
(H
j > L
j ) which in turn implies that exporting to high-income markets is more skill-intensive than
exporting to low income markets (SH
j > SL
j ). The quality valuation mechanism does not provide
a general prediction regarding skill intensity for exports vis- a-vis domestic sales. The relative skill
use depends on the income level of the domestic market. For a middle-income source country like




j . This shows that, ceteris paribus, exporters to high-income destinations utilize
more skills than both other exporters and domestic producers.8
The \required services" mechanism of Matsuyama (2007) implies that reaching consumers
abroad is more costly than reaching domestic consumers. Because  captures exporting services,





j . The required services are related to the exporting technology,
instead of demand, and are thus not directly related to income. As a result, the channel does not
provide a prediction regarding SH
j and SL
j . In the case of Argentina, low and middle-income markets
in South America (Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile) are geographically close, and share the same
or similar languages, similar cultural heritage, and similar business models. On the other hand,
exporting to most high-income destinations (U.S., Germany, U.K.) requires higher transport costs,
English speaking managers, and more able managers and entrepreneurs to adopt foreign business
8In the presence transport costs, this result needs to be qualied to accommodate the shipping -the-good-apples-out
argument of Hummels and Skiba (2004). In particular, if transport costs are non-proportional then high-priced,
high-quality goods become relatively cheaper in high-transport-cost markets, which will thus disproportionately
demand higher-quality goods. It is possible for two countries with the same valuation of quality (the same ) to
have dierent demands for quality. If, as we discuss in the empirical section, high-transport-cost countries are also
high-income countries, then domestic rms will disproportionately ship higher quality goods to those markets but
not necessarily because of lower  but rather because of higher (non-proportional) transport costs.




result establishes the second link between export destinations and skills.
Our model is also useful to clarify a few specic issues related to the empirical strategy in
section 3. In the data, we do not observe Sc
j, the level of skills used to serve dierent destinations,
at the rm level. Instead, we observe the aggregate skill composition (Sj) and the level of sales by
country of destination. Thus, we need to be able to establish dierences in SH
j , SL
j , and SD
j from
changes in these observable variables. To see how we do this, note rst that relative demand for
skilled workers at the rm level can be written as a weighted average of the relative demands for
skilled workers employed in the production and delivery of goods that are shipped to each of the
three destinations:
















where x = xD + xL + xH is total rm sales (including domestic sales and exports to dierent
destinations). Since SH > SL and SH > SD, the higher the share of exports destined to high
income countries is, the higher the relative demand for skilled labor becomes (controlling for the
share of exports in total sales). Note also that rms exporting to high income countries will incur
a higher wage bill since skilled labor earns a higher wage than unskilled labor.10
Second, as we will shortly discuss, our empirical strategy exploits exogenous changes in exports
and in export destinations of Argentine rms brought about by a Brazilian devaluation that took
place in 1999. In our model, the Brazilian devaluation causes a decrease in demand in low-income
markets (because Brazilian demand declines), without aecting market conditions in high-income
destinations. As a result, some exporters to low income foreign markets will exit (eventually
retrenching into local markets) and exporters to high income markets will sell less in low income
markets. This implies that the share of exports to high income markets will increase and so will
the utilization of skills, as per equation (6). Note that this is a within-rm composition eect,
where a weighted average (total skill utilization) changes due to changes in the participation of
9Note that some low-income destinations such as China, India or Africa are geographically and culturally far from
Argentina (but may share instead more similar business practices and models). These destinations amount to a small
share of exports, however.
10There are other mechanisms that could in principle explain a positive link between exporting to high-income
countries and wages in a country like Argentina. One explanation is \prot sharing" in a model of fair wages (Egger
and Kreickemeier, 2009; Amiti and Davis, 2011). It is also possible that exporting to developed countries is associated
with higher wages to reduce labor turnover. Another theory due to Yeaple (2005) argues for higher wages due to
scale economies attached to exporting (to dierent destinations).
9each destination in total sales. This corresponds to changes in the weights with constant Sc
j in
equation (6).
In a more general model, the devaluation of the low income country's currency could also boost
exports into high income markets. This can happen if, for instance, there are increasing marginal
costs with joint production or capacity constraints. In this setting, production shipped to Brazil
aects the costs incurred in production shipped to, for instance, the U.S. (and vice-versa). As a
result, when Brazil devalues, shipments to Brazil contract, and this reduces production costs to
U.S., so that exports to the U.S. can actually increase. In this case, the increase in the share of
high-income markets will be twofold, rst because of a decrease in exports to Brazil, and second
because of an absolute increase in exports to the U.S.
3 Empirical Analysis
We now turn to our empirical analysis. We describe the data, introduce the regression model and
the identication strategy, and present the main ndings on exports, export destinations and skill
utilization in Argentina.
3.1 The Data
We use two main sources of data in our analysis: a rm survey and administrative customs
information. The rm survey is the \Encuesta Nacional Industrial" (ENI) or National Industrial
Survey. The ENI is a panel of manufacturing plants and collects information on sales, value added,
input use, employment of production workers, employment of non-production workers, total wage
bill, and industry aliation at the 3-digit level of the ISIC Revision 2 classication. We have access
to the module of the survey that corresponds to the province of Buenos Aires for the years 1998,
1999 and 2000.11 A key limitation of these data is sample size, with only 901 rms in a short 3-year
panel.
The second source of data for our analysis is administrative customs records. From the customs
records we extracted the total value of exports by country of destination at the rm level.12 We
then matched this information to the rm survey using tax identication numbers. The result is a
11Being the most highly industrialized and developed area of the country, the province of Buenos Aires accounts for
40 percent of the population and more than half of the manufacturing activity in terms of employment and output.
12We do not have access to quantities or unit values.
10panel of employment, wages, exports, and export destinations by rm.
The rm survey was collected at the plant level but customs information was recorded at the rm
level. Since all plants owned by a same rm share the same identication number, we aggregated
information across plants owned by a given rm and created a dataset at the rm level that we
then matched with the customs records. In our survey, only 14 percent of rms own more than one
plant. In the online appendix, we show that regression results are very similar whether we use the
full sample of rms or only one-plant rms.13
Table 1 presents summary statistics from the combination of rm and customs data for the
full sample 1998-2000. In Panel A, we describe the export intensity and export destinations of
Argentine rms; in Panel B, we focus on dierences in outcomes (employment, wages, and skill
utilization) across rms. Out of 901 rms and 2544 rm-year observations, 68 percent of rms
exported in at least one of the three years of data, while in a given year, the average share of
exporters is 59 percent (Panel A). The proportion of exporters is higher than what the literature
typically nds. This can be partly explained by the fact that our rm survey corresponds to an
export-oriented geographic area of Argentina.14 The share of exports in total sales is, in contrast,
small: exports account for only 8 percent of sales across all rms (column 1) and 13 percent among
exporters (column 2). The average number of destinations (including the domestic market) is 3.3
in the sample of all rms and 4.9 among exporters.
In columns 3 and 4, we describe the characteristics of rms that export to at least one high
income destination, the \high-income exporters." We work with two denitions of high-income
destinations based on the World Bank country classication. In the rst denition (Denition I),
we include countries classied as high-income OECD, high-income non-OECD and upper-middle
income. The countries in each group are listed in the online appendix. On average, each year
51 percent of rms export to at least one high-income destination (1307 out of 2544 rm-year
observations). For high-income exporters, total exports (to all destinations) account for 15 percent
of total sales and the average number of destinations, including domestic sales, is 5.4.
In the second denition (Denition II), we classify as high-income destinations only countries
in the World Bank's high-income group, while upper-middle income economies are excluded. In
this grouping, the number of rms that export to high-income countries drops to 27 percent (680
13The online appendix is available at the authors' websites.
14At the same time, the high share of exporting rms is not explained by biases in rm size, as the ENI covers
rms of all sizes (provided they are in the formal sector), based on censuses sampling weights. While tax evasion and
worker informality are prevalent among manufacturing rms in Argentina, rm informality is not.
11out of 2544 rm-year observations). These rms show a higher export intensity (exports account
for 22 percent of total sales) and a higher number of destinations (7.8 per rm). For our regression
analysis, we chose the rst classication as our main specication to show that even under a
conservative denition there are signicant dierences between high- and low-income exporters. As
we will show below, these dierences are magnied when we apply the more liberal denition that
excludes upper-middle income economies from the high-income destinations set.
Panel B of Table 1 explores the relationship between skill utilization, exports and export
destinations by comparing exporters and non-exporters. From the ENI panel survey, we report
in column 1 average employment, sales and two measures of skill utilization. Our rst measure
is the average wage, dened as the total wage bill divided by total employment. In the surveys,
rms report the total wage bill, which includes total payments to all workers, production and
non-production. Firms, however, do not report the wage paid to dierent types of workers. The
average wage is a proxy for skill utilization inasmuch as rms with a higher skill composition pay
higher wages. Firms do report separately the total number of employees in each of those two
categories. Our second measure of skill utilization is thus the share of non-production workers in
total employment.15 In our sample, rms employ an average of 89.7 workers and pay average annual
wages of 12,154 USD. Non-production workers account for 26 percent of total employment. In
column 2, we report dierences between exporters and non-exporters by running an OLS regression
of each rm attribute on a dummy of whether the rm exports or not (which we build using the
matched customs data), controlling for 3-digit industry and year eects. Our data conrm the
stylized fact of this literature: Exporters are larger by around 122 percent (173 percent in terms
of sales); they pay higher wages by about 48 percent; and they hire 5 percentage points more
non-production workers than non-exporters.
In column 3, we compare high-income exporters to low-income exporters. Conditional on
exporting, we run OLS regressions of the various outcomes on a dummy for high-income exporters
(controlling for industry and year eects). Using Denition I, the results show that rms that
export to at least one high-income destination are 39 percent larger in terms of employment and
54 percent larger in terms of sales than exporters that only export to low income countries; they
pay higher wages by about 12 percent; and they hire a larger fraction of non-production workers by
15Firms also report hours worked by each of the two categories of employment and our results are robust to using
the share of hours worked by non-production workers as a measure of skill utilization. Note that we do not have
information on the educational level of the workers.
12about 3 more percentage points. Thus, exporters have good attributes, and high-income exporters
have even better attributes.
Column 4 compares high-income exporters in Denition I with those in Denition II. The
data show that rm dierences persist among high-income exporters. For instance, Denition II
high-income exporters are larger (by 43 percent in terms of employment and by 54 percent in
terms of sales) than Denition I high-income exporters. They also pay higher average wages (by
15 percent) and employ a higher share of non-production workers (by 1.4 percentage points).
3.2 Skills and Export Destinations: The Empirical Model
The statistics reported in Table 1 uncover the basic relationship between exports, export
destinations and skills. We now study this relationship in more detail with the following regression
model:
(7) sijt = 1EXPijt + 2HIijt + x0
ijt1 + jt + i + ijt:
The variable sijt is a measure of the utilization of skills in the labor force employed by rm i
in industry j at time t (i.e., the average wage and the share of non-production workers in total
employment). The right-hand side variables of interest are EXP and HI. Let Eijt be total exports
of rm i, let Yijt be total sales (including domestic sales and exports) and let EHijt be exports to
high-income destinations.16 We dene EXPijt = Eijt=Yijt as the ratio of total rm exports to total
rm sales. We use this variable rather than an exporter dummy because EXP captures the intensity
of the exporting status and because it has much more variability within rms in a 3-year panel
such as ours, but we also explore results using an export dummy indicator. HIijt = EHijt=Eijt
is dened as the share of rm exports to high-income destinations over total rm exports. This
variable is a measure of the composition of exports across destinations and captures the impact of
exporting to high-income countries once export intensity has been accounted for. In our robustness
tests below, we also report results where we measure HI as the ratio of exports to high-income
destinations over sales.
The vector of rm characteristics, x, includes industry dummies (when rm xed eects are
16In most of this section, we use the conservative denition (Denition I) where high income destinations are
countries in the high-income OECD, high-income non-OECD and upper-middle income groups of the World Bank
classication. We later show robustness results dropping the group of upper-middle income countries from high-income
destinations.
13not included), rm size measured by the log of total sales, and dierential trends across time at the
rm level (which we discuss below). The error term includes a rm xed eect i, a year-industry
(at the 3-digit level) xed-eect jt, and a random component ijt.
To uncover the basic correlations that we want to study, we start by estimating (7) by OLS,
pooling all years of data but including industry and year xed eects. The results are in Table 2.
In Panel A, we work with our rst proxy for skill utilization, average wages. In column 1, where
we include EXP but exclude HI, we conrm the cross-section result: rms with higher ratios of
exports to sales pay higher wages. In column 2, where we include HI, high-income destination
exports, but we exclude EXP, we nd a positive and signicant coecient as well. In column 3,
we include both the exports to sales ratio (EXP) and the ratio of exports to high income (HI) in
the same regression. Both coecients are positive and statistically signicant. Overall, thus, we
observe that skill utilization is positively correlated not only with export intensity but also with the
destination of a rm's exports. This means that, conditional on the same export intensity, rms
that ship a larger share of their exports to high-income markets utilize, on average, more skills.
In Panel B, we work with our second proxy for s, the share of non-production workers in total
rm employment. When we only include EXP (column 1), we nd a positive correlation, albeit
not statistically signicant, between export intensity and skills. When we only include HI, we nd
a strong positive correlation between exporting to high-income countries and skill composition.
Finally, when both EXP and HI are included (column 3), exporting to high-income countries is
positively correlated with a higher utilization of skills, but export intensity is not.
Both the simple correlations in Table 1 and the OLS estimates in Table 2 are consistent with
the claim that exporters utilize relatively more skilled labor and that exporters to high-income
markets even more than exporters. In the light of our model in Section 2, there are two ways
to interpret these ndings with dierent implications about the behavior of exporting rms (to
dierent destinations).
Our model combines dierences in the xed costs of exporting to dierent destinations,
multi-dimensional rm heterogeneity (the parameters a and b), and dierences in both the marginal
utility of income () and in the costs of exporting () across destinations. Consider rst a scenario
where there are no dierences in  and , so that we \shut down" both the quality (Verhoogen
2008) and exporting technology (Matsuyama 2007) mechanisms. We retain the dierences in a and
b and we assume higher xed costs in the high-income market, lower in the low-income market,
14and even lower domestically, FH > FL > FD. In this scenario, since  and  are the same




it ). However, this level of skill will vary across rms according to their eciency in
the utilization of skilled and unskilled labor (parameters a and b). This is because more ecient
rms will choose a higher level of vertical dierentiation for their products, which provides higher
prots. At the same time, the dierences in xed costs generate a sorting of rms, where rms
with lower a and b will be more likely to nd it protable to export to high income destinations.
This scenario generates a positive association between the skill (s) and the export destination
variables and it is thus consistent with the OLS results of Table 2. There is no causality, however.
The correlation arises because of the selection of rms into the dierent export markets. In other
words, there are productivity and cost shocks that allow rms to simultaneously enter or expand
their export operations and hire dierent skill levels.
Let us now add the quality and export technology channels. We showed that in a scenario with
lower marginal utility of income in high-income destinations (H < L = D) and with more costly
technology to export to high-income markets (H > L > D = 0), rms will use a higher share
of skilled workers in their exports to high-income markets (SH
it > SL
it > SD
it ). This result is not
directly testable with our data, since we do not observe skill use by country of destination. Instead,
we observe the total skill intensity, which is a weighted average of the skill use in each destination as
given by equation (6). However, since SH
it > SL
it > SD
it , we should observe that for a given rm, the
average skill use increases with the share of high-income exports. This scenario is also consistent
with the OLS results of Table 2 but the implications are dierent. The correlation between skill use
and high-income exports is not merely due to selection across rms but also because of dierences
in rm behavior (i.e., the utilization of dierent skills in serving dierent markets) in response to
dierences in  and .
For our analysis, we want to be able to discern between the two scenarios, because they have
implications regarding the relevance of the theoretical mechanisms. Clearly, it matters if the
correlations between the variables are only due to selection of more productive rms or also to
behavioral responses. OLS cannot distinguish between the two scenarios.17 To tell them apart,
we develop an empirical strategy to look at changes within rms and use instruments that explain
17There are other sources of unobserved heterogeneity which are beyond the scope of the model but that could be
aecting the correlation in skill utilization and high income exports in the data. We discuss those below, when we
compare the OLS and IV results.
15exogenous shifts in the export share of high-income destinations. This strategy provides an answer




it , does the average skill use go up if there is an exogenous increase in the
share of high income destinations?
3.3 Identication Strategy
There are two endogenous variables in our model: exporting to high-income destinations HI (the
share of exports to high income countries on total rm exports), and export intensity EXP (the
share of exports in sales). To achieve identication, we exploit the panel nature of our data and
we use instrumental variables. The panel allows us to track rms over time. The instruments
exploit the exogenous variation in HI and EXP caused by the Brazilian devaluation of 1999,
which induced Argentine rms to cut sales in Brazil and to expand sales both domestically and in
high-income countries.18 Ultimately, our strategy boils down to tracking changes in skill utilization
for a given rm, due to responses in exports and export destinations following the exogenous
Brazilian devaluation.
Argentina and Brazil are major trade partners and thus the Brazilian devaluation had an impact
on Argentine exports that is large enough to achieve identication. Argentine export statistics by
country of destination, shown in Table 3, provide prima-facie evidence in support of our strategy.
In the pre-devaluation year of 1998, Argentine exports were destined mostly to Brazil (36 percent),
Europe (13 percent), the United States (10 percent) and neighbors like Chile (6 percent), Uruguay
(4 percent) and Paraguay (3 percent). In 1999, when Brazil devalued, the share of exports to Brazil
dropped to 28 percent. These shares partially recovered in 2000, reaching 31 percent. Consistent
with our argument above, alternative markets for Argentine exports were found in the U.S. (with
shares increasing to 13 percent in 1999 and 15 percent in 2000) and Europe (with shares increasing
to 15 percent in 1999 and 14 percent in 2000). At the bottom of Table 3, we observe that the share
of exports destined to high-income countries increased from 43 percent in 1998 to 50 percent in
1999 and 51 percent in 2000 (using Denition I) and from 28 percent to 34 percent (using Denition
II).
In Table 3, we also report changes in export values. As expected, exports to Brazil declined,
18There is a growing literature that looks at changes in major trade partners as a source of identication. Exchange
rates of trade partners were used for instance by Revenga (1992) and Park et al. (2010). Changes in Brazilian taris
due to Mercosur were used to identify impacts on Argentine rms in Bustos (2011). Verhoogen (2008) uses the own
devaluation of Mexico to link exports to wage inequality.
16because Brazilian domestic products became relatively more inexpensive. At the bottom of the
table, we show that exports to high-income destinations increased signicantly, from 6.5 billion
dollars in 1998 to 7.2 billion dollars in 2000. This expansion is largely accounted for by an increase
in exports to the U.S., from 1.6 to 2.2 billion dollars. While it is interesting to conrm that exports
to high-income countries increased, this result is not necessary for identication. Clearly, however,
the fact that exports to high-income countries actually increased in the data only reinforces the
mechanisms that we exploit in our empirical analysis.
Our empirical test is related to Verhoogen's approach in that both use devaluation episodes.
However, while Verhoogen exploits Mexico's own Peso devaluation of 1994, we focus here on
the devaluation of a major trading partner and exploit exogenous changes in exports to various
destinations. This provides a cleaner environment for identication, allows us to test the importance
of export destinations vis- a-vis exports, and to disentangle the eects of factors such as technology
and willingness to pay.
3.4 IV Results
We build separate instruments for HI and EXP. Our instrument for HI is dened as IHI
it =
Postt  BRA
i98 , that is, it is the interaction of a Post devaluation variable with the pre-devaluation
share of the rm's exports that were destined to Brazil, BRA
i98 . Since the 1998 shares BRA
i98 precede
the devaluation, they measure exogenous exposure to it. The rationale for this instrument is that,
as documented in Table 3, rms that were most exposed to the Brazilian devaluation adjusted by
moving away from this market and by exploring new markets in high-income countries. We expect
a positive correlation between the \scope to divert exports" and exports to high-income markets.
We adopt two specications for Post. In the relatively more non-parametric model we interact
the level of exposure to Brazil before the devaluation, BRA
i98 , with 1999 and 2000 year dummy
variables, so that the instrumental variables are
(8) I
HI1
it = t  BRA
i98 ;
where t denotes the 1999 and 2000 year dummies. This specication allows the impacts of the
devaluation to vary from one year to the other as rms adjust to the exchange rate shock. In
the second specication, we interact BRA








Since the initial shares of Brazilian exports play a predominant role in the construction of our
instrument, we report summary statistics from the rm data on the share of exports to dierent
destinations in Table 4. The export-weighted average of the share of exports to Brazil in 1998
was 37 percent, declined to 32 percent in 1999 and to 35 percent in 2000. This decline correlates
with an increase in the share of exports to high-income countries from 49 percent in 1998 to 58
and 54 percent in 1999 and 2000, respectively. Unconditionally, the share of Brazilian exports
declined from 19 percent in 1998 to 16 percent in 2000, while the share of high-income exports
increased from 29 to 33 percent from 1998 to 2000. These trends are consistent with the story
behind our identication strategy. Table 4 also reports average shares for dierent types of rms.
For instance, with an average share of 27 percent, large rms were more exposed to Brazil in
1998 and thus increased the share of exports to high-income destination from 40 to 47 percent.
Dierent industries reacted dierently as well. For instance, the share of exports to Brazil in
\Paper products," a highly-exposed industry, declined from 25 percent in 1998 to 16 percent in
2000, with an increase in the share of high-income exports from 31 to 48 percent. In contrast, the
share of exports to Brazil in \Leather" was only 1 percent in 1998 (and remained roughly constant
after the devaluation), while the share of exports to high-income countries in this sector in fact
declined from 37 to 32 percent during the period.
To deal with the endogeneity of the ratio of exports over sales (EXP), we construct a measure






t   c
i98;
where  c
i98 is the share of exports of rm i to country c on total sales in 1998 (which is
predetermined) and eratec
t is the exchange rate of country c (relative to the Argentine Peso) at
time t. Instruments such as (10) have been used before by, for example, Revenga (1992) and Park
et al. (2008). Given the shares of export sales to market c in 1998, a higher exchange rate would
induce rm i to export more to this market, thus increasing EXPit. In consequence, we expect
18EXP to be positively correlated with IEXP in the rst stage regressions.19
Good instruments have to be exogenous, help to explain the endogenous variables, and satisfy
the exclusion restrictions. As argued above, our instruments are prima-facie correlated with the
level of exports and with its composition across destinations, and we further test these correlations
below with results from the rst-stage regressions. In addition, the Brazilian devaluation generated
exogenous variation in export intensity (EXP) and in export destinations (HI), and these changes
in exports are plausibly exogenous to the pre-devaluation shares of exports to Brazil. Likewise,
our second instrument is based on arguably exogenous changes in the exchange rates of all trading
partners and on each rm's exposure to those changes given their pre-shock export share over
sales. In other words, while the pre-shock shares are a choice variable of the rm, once they
are predetermined, the dierential change in exports due to the devaluation of Brazil (or other
countries) is reasonably exogenous. In our empirical analysis, we discuss various tests of potential
violations of the exclusion restrictions. As a caveat, note that our strategy can fail if there is serial
correlation in the errors, but we cannot do much about this with our short 3-year panel. As we
show next, however, our IV results are very robust.
We begin with Table 5, which shows results from the baseline model where our measure of skills
is the average wage bill, the instrument for HI is the interaction between initial shares in 1998 with
year dummies (equation (8)), and the instrument for EXP is the average weighted exchange rate
(equation (10)). Panel A reports the IV estimates of 1 and 2 in (7); Panels B1 and B2 document
the rst stage regressions for HI and EXP, respectively.
To benchmark the discussion, we begin in column 1 with a simple model including HI and EXP
as regressors but omitting all controls as well as the industry-year eects: we nd that exporting
per se does not raise skill utilization, but exporting to high income countries does. The rst stage
regressions (panels B1 and B2) allow us to assess the instruments, which work very well. They
have substantial explanatory power, are statistically signicant, and the p-values associated with
the F-statistic of joint signicance of the instruments are very low.
In columns 2-5, we include various controls to test for potential violations of the exclusion
restrictions that can arise if the devaluation of a major trading partner or the 1999 concurrent
domestic recession had heterogeneous eects across industries. For instance, the evidence in Galiani
19Note that while 
BRA
98 in equations (8) and (9) is the share of exports to Brazil in total exports,  
c
98 in equation
(10) is the share of exports to country c on total sales. As a consequence, the instruments convey dierent useful
information for identication purposes. Also, using sales in the denominator is actually preferred in the case of I
EXP
because we are instrumenting the degree of export orientation of the rm.
19and Hopenhayn (2003) suggests that unskilled workers, rather than skilled workers, are the rst
to be laid o during a recession, and this may lead to higher average wages and higher shares of
non-production (skilled) employment. If these eects were industry-specic, we can account for
them with industry-year xed eects, which we add in column 2. With industries disaggregated at
the 3-digit level, these industry-year eects are quite comprehensive. The results remain unchanged:
only exporting to high-income countries matters. The rst stage results (panels B1 and B2) are
also robust to the addition of the industry-year eects.
Another concern with the exclusion restriction are rm-specic trends. There can be unobserved
factors that simultaneously determine the choice of export shares to Brazil in 1998 and the
subsequent response to the devaluation. For example, pre-devaluation productivity shocks or cost
shocks that persist in time imply that a rm's ability to change export destinations might depend on
the initial share exported to Brazil (in 1998). To control for these unobserved pre-shock dierences
in initial conditions, we interact log sales in 1998 with year dummies (column 3) and with the
Brazilian exchange rate (column 4). In addition, the crisis might have aected exporters and
non-exporters dierently. If non-exporters are hit harder than exporters by the domestic recession,
because they cannot sell to unaected countries (such as the U.S. or the E.U.), then non-exporters
may suer larger prot losses and, eventually, may need to impose larger wage cuts. To control
for this, we interact the exporter status in 1998 with year dummies (column 3) and with the
Brazilian exchange rate (column 4). In the specications in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5, EXP is
never statistically signicant, while HI is always positive and highly signicant. In addition, the
coecients in columns 3 and 4 (0.267 and 0.284) are comparable to those in the simpler models
of columns 1-2. In panels B1 and B2, we nd that the addition of controls for the rm's initial
conditions does not aect the statistical properties of our instruments.
In column 5, we estimate the model with the log of sales as an additional control in the regression
for time-varying heterogeneity such as current productivity or cost shocks. Note that we use sales
as a proxy for unobserved characteristics in order to improve the estimation of 1 and 2; we
consequently do not attach any causal interpretation to the coecient of log sales. Our main
results remain unchanged: EXP does not aect skill use, but HI does. The estimated coecient
of HI is 0.260, implying that a rm with the average shares of exports to high-income countries
(30 percent) pays around 7.8 percent higher wages than rms that do not export at all to these
markets. Besides, the 3.4 percentage points increase in export shares to high-income destinations
20observed in our data between 1998 and 2000 implies, ceteris paribus, an increase in average wages
of 0.9 percentage points.
Before testing the robustness of the results, we compare our IV estimates with OLS-FE
estimates. In column 6, the FE coecient is positive, not statistically signicant, and, more
importantly, much smaller than the IV coecient. Note that unobserved rm attributes such
as inherent productivity or cost shocks would in principle generate the opposite bias. For
instance, positive productivity shocks are likely to simultaneously allow rms to expand high-income
operations and utilize more skills so that OLS-FE results would be biased upwards. However,
there are at least four mechanisms, some of them inherent to the Argentine case, that suggest a
downward bias in the OLS-FE regressions. First, OLS-FE estimates are attenuated when rms
are subject to policy or domestic regulatory shocks. For instance, rms that are more likely to
be \captured" by unions could be less likely to export, especially to high-income countries, while
at the same time they would be required to pay higher wages on average (see Galiani and Porto,
2010). Second, high-income exporters are likely to have ties with multinational corporations and
may base a larger fraction of their managerial operations abroad. Failure to control for this type
of rm outsourcing may drive the OLS-FE estimates downward. Third, a potentially important
unobserved factor is imports, because Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) show that
exporters are also importers and thus if high-income exporters are more likely to import goods to
resell domestically, their labor demand and wage payments may also be lower. Finally, OLS-FE
may be attenuated by stock liquidation during the 1999 domestic recession. The crisis aected all
rms, but high-income exporters may be in a better position to run inventories down by liquidating
stocks, originally planned for the domestic markets, in their export markets. Note that this is akin
to measurement error in the export shares to high income countries in 1999 and 2000 because these
shares increase due to inventory liquidation rather than to rm behavioral responses. This leads
to typical attenuation bias in the pooled OLS regressions, which is actually exacerbated in the
OLS-FE regressions. Our IV model is instead based on changes in exports shares caused by the
exogenous Brazilian devaluation and thus only pick up the change in HI that occurs because of
changes in rm behavior.20 In column 7, we re-estimate the OLS-FE model excluding data for year
1999. This regression is in fact exploiting a 2-year (2000-1998) variation in export destinations
20To put the argument into a standard measurement error interpretation, the variable HI should measure
production decisions (i.e., skill utilization) based on the destination of the rms exports. The claim is that HI
correctly measures these decisions in normal periods, such as 1998. However, during the crisis of 1999 and 2000 rms
liquidate stocks and this creates variation in HI that is spurious.
21and skill utilization and is, we argue, less subject to this type of measurement error. The OLS-FE
estimate is still biased down, but it is larger, positive, and statistically signicant, a nding that
provides some support to the presence of attenuation bias.
As an additional robustness check, we run all the previous specications using the alternative
instrument for HI, equation (9) instead of (8). That is, the instrument is the interaction of the
initial shares of exports to Brazil with the Brazilian exchange rate. Results are reported in Table 6.
As before, panel A shows the IV estimates of 1 and 2, and panels B1 and B2 show the rst-stage
results for HI and EXP, respectively. All ndings remain unchanged. The ratio of exports to
sales (EXP) is never signicant and the ratio of exports to high-income markets on total exports
(HI) is always signicant. The estimated coecients are also very similar. For instance, in our
preferred specication with controls for log sales (column 5), our estimate of 2 is 0.272 and it was
0.260 in Table 5. In the rst-stage results in panels B1 and B2, the instruments show the expected
signs, are jointly signicant, and there is no risk of weak instrumentation.
Before discussing our interpretation of these ndings, Table 7 reports the results from models
where skill utilization is measured with the share of non-production workers on total employment.
In panel A, we use the instrument for HI built with year dummies (equation (8)); in panel B, we
replace year dummies with exchange rates (equation (9)). In both cases, the instrument for EXP
is given by (10). Our results suggest that, as before, the ratio of exports to sales does not seem
to have an eect on the composition of skills at the rm level, whereas exporting to high-income
countries does matter. In our preferred specication, column 5, we nd that a rm exporting to
high-income destinations at the average share of 0.30 utilizes 2.37 percentage points more skilled
workers than non-high-income exporters.
It is important to note that the changes in skill utilization that occur as rms change export
destinations do not appear to be the result of a spurious shrinking of the unskilled labor force
(Galiani and Hopenhayn, 2003). To verify this, we estimated separate IV regressions using the
log of skilled and unskilled labor employment as dependent variables. The results (available in the
online appendix) reveal positive impacts on skilled employment and negative impacts on unskilled
employment (though both impacts are relatively imprecisely estimated). This means that rms
that switched to high-income destinations due to the Brazilian devaluation simultaneously increased
absolute employment of skilled workers and reduced employment of unskilled workers. Second, in
reduced form regressions, we nd that rms more exposed to Brazil in 1998 actually increased skill
22employment but did not modify unskilled employment, and this is consistent with the behavioral
responses highlighted in this paper. Taken together, these results allow us to rule out a scenario
where rms that exported more to Brazil in 1998 were the ones to downsize unskilled workers
disproportionately because of the recession (thus paying higher wages and employing a higher
share of non-production workers).
Turning to the interpretation of our ndings, the reason why exporting to high-income countries
(HI) is signicant, while exporting (EXP) per se is not, is the following. If the domestic market
in Argentina is similar to export markets in low- and middle-income economies (including any
xed costs), then the nature of domestic rms and of low-income exporters, in terms of their
attributes a and b, will be similar and, consequently, dierences in skill utilization will be small.
In contrast, exporting to high-income countries does need quality upgrades and required-services,
which implies a signicantly higher utilization of skills. A potential concern with this conclusion
is that we are exploiting the negative shock created by the Brazilian devaluation, rather than a
permanent expansion in export opportunities. However, evidence from the international nance
literature has consistently reported persistent exchange rate shocks, and this suggests that the
Brazilian devaluation can actually be seen as a permanent or persistent shock (Rogo, 1996).
The nding that export destinations, especially exports to high-income countries, matter has
found recent support in the related literature. Using transaction-level data for Portugal, Bastos and
Silva (2010) document higher unit values in shipments to richer nations. Manova and Zhang (2011)
also nd that Chinese rms set higher prices in richer and more distant markets (see also Martin,
2010). In turn, G org, Halpern and Murak ozy (2010) use Hungarian rm-product-destination data
to establish a positive correlation between unit values and the per capita GDP of the export
destination. In our data, we only have information on export volumes, not on unit values. However,
the aggregate trade data for Argentina is consistent with these observations. In particular, in 2000,
the unit values of exports to high-income countries were 4 percent higher than the unit values of
exports to low-income countries.
3.5 A Validation Exercise
In this section, we perform a validation exercise where we explore results under the more stringent
denition of \High-Income" destinations, which includes only High-Income OECD and High-Income
non-OECD countries (Denition II, see section 3 and the online appendix). Table 8 reports IV
23results using both log average wages (Panel A) and the share of non-production workers (Panel
B) as our measures of skill utilization. To simplify the exposition, we only report IV estimates
from regressions models that include industry-year eects and initial conditions, and that use
the more non-parametric set of instruments (IHI1, the share of Brazil in exports in 1998 times
year eects, and IEXP, the weighted average exchange rate, dened in equations (8) and (10),
respectively). In Table 8, we conrm our conclusion that exporting per se does not really matter
but that exporting to high-income countries does. In fact, we nd that under the more stringent
denition of high-income destinations the coecients are close to three times larger than under
Denition I. For instance, in the model of wages controlling for log sales, the coecient on HI is
0.781 instead of 0.260. At the average share of exports to High-Income II, 8.5 percent, the results
imply that high-income exporters pay 6.6 percent higher wages. This result is consistent with our
hypothesis since we expect larger dierences in  and , and thus in skill utilization, the higher
the income of the high-income destination group. Our conclusions are robust to results (reported
in the online appendix) using the alternative set of instruments given by (9), the share of Brazil in
exports in 1998 times the Brazilian exchange rate, and (10).
3.6 Additional Robustness Tests
Table 9 reports results from various robustness tests. In all these regressions, we include
industry-year eects and the two sets of controls for initial conditions. In panel A, the dependent
variable is log wages; in panel B, it is the share of non-production workers. In the rst test, we
replace our measure of HI by the ratio of rich-countries exports to total sales (in place of the
share of exports to rich countries in total exports). In column 1, HI is positive and signicant for
both log wages and the share of non-production workers. The coecients are also larger, which is
consistent with the fact that the share of exports to Brazil on total exports is much higher than
the share of exports to Brazil on total sales (with averages of 30 and 4 percent, respectively). We
still do not nd any impact of the ratio of exports to total sales.
Second, although our test of relative skill utilization across destinations operates via
compositional changes within rms (that is, changes in the export participation weights of the
dierent Sc
j in equation (6)), the impact should in principle be stronger for rms that actually
increased exports to high-income destinations (in absolute value) than for rms that only adjusted
exports to Brazil. We explore this in columns 2 and 3 of Table 9. For rms that increased exports to
24high-income countries between 1998 and 2000, the estimated coecient of HI is 0.430 (column 2),
whereas the estimate is 0.319 for the rest of the sample (column 3). Both estimates are statistically
signicant. The point estimates are much larger for rms that expanded rich-country exports, both
for log wages and for the share of non-production workers. This dierence, although not signicant,
points in the expected direction. These results are reassuring.
Finally, we explore results on export intensity and export status to assess whether regressions
based on export intensity (or status) actually confound the role of exports and exports to
high-income countries. In column 4, we report estimates from an IV model that includes EXP
but omits HI. In this case, a higher ratio of exports over sales is positively associated with skill
utilization and the coecient (0.208) is in fact twice as large as that in column 5 of Table 5 (0.101),
with comparable standard errors. The estimates are not statistically signicant, however, and this
is mainly because the covariance between EXP and HI is not high enough to overturn the lack
of explanatory power of EXP itself. In column 5, we replace the export intensity EXP variable
with an export dummy (using the same instruments). Exporting positively aects skill utilization
but, once again, the estimates are not statistically signicant. Finally, in column 6 we include
an exporter dummy together with a high-income exporter dummy (instrumenting both with our
standard set of instruments). The results are consistent with the conclusion that while exporters
to high-income countries do hire more skills, exporters to other destination do not.
4 Channels
In this section, we set out to uncover some of the channels behind our \export destinations matter"
result. We want to illustrate the mechanisms by which Argentine rms that became more oriented
towards high-income destinations utilized more skills.
4.1 Skill Upgrading Within Labor Categories
We begin with a simple extension of our baseline regression model. We re-estimate the wage
specication with the addition of the share of non-production workers as a regressor to test whether
HI remains statistically signicant. We include, as before, both HI and EXP as explanatory
variables, and we instrument them with IHI1 and IEXP. Results are reported in Table 10 (similar
results are obtained when we use IHI2, in place of IHI1, and IEXP as instruments). We nd that
25export intensity, EXP, is never signicant, while HI, exports to high-income countries, always is.
As expected, the share of non-production workers is positively associated with the average rm
wage because on average non-production workers are more skilled than production workers. In
addition, the coecient of HI is smaller than in all previous regressions. Taken together, these
results indicate that part of the impact of HI on average wages eectively works through increases
in the share of non-production workers but that there are also other channels playing a role.
One plausible mechanism is skill upgrading within labor categories. The average wage paid
by the rm is a weighted average of the wages paid to production and non-production workers.
Our ndings so far revealed that rms exporting to high-income countries pay higher average
wages, hire a higher share of non-production workers, and pay higher average wages conditional
on the non-production workers shares. This last result is consistent with a scenario where rms
engage in skill upgrading within skill categories and possibly utilize better (that is, more skilled)
non-production and production workers (in at least one of the two categories). To further clarify
this idea, assume that, within the non-production worker category, there are semiskilled and skilled
workers and that skilled wages are higher than semiskilled wages. Our nding of higher shares of
non-production workers associated with high-income exports can be the result of both more skilled
or semiskilled workers, but if the mechanism operates via more skilled workers, then average wages
will be even higher. This channel is consistent with the within-category skill upgrading uncovered
by Verhoogen (2008).21
4.2 Quality Valuation and Required Services
In our theory, we discussed a quality upgrading and a required services mechanism. In what follows,
we attempt to tell them apart. First, note that the quality mechanism should be stronger in sectors
with higher scope for quality/services upgrades. To test this, we estimate our IV regressions after
splitting the sample according to the variance of the unit values in exports at the industry level (a
measure of the degree of product vertical dierentiation in the sector). Unit values were calculated
using industry-level bilateral trade data from COMTRADE. First, we matched the COMTRADE
trade data to the industrial classication system from the rm survey, the ISIC Revision 2 at the 3
digit level. Second, for each 3-digit industry, we computed the variance in export unit values from
all pairwise combinations of countries of origin and destination that report to COMTRADE, after
21Note that, as discussed in the theoretical model, we cannot rule out other possible mechanisms like prot-sharing
(fair wages), labor turnover, or scale economies.
26trimming outliers. Finally, we classied industries as \High Variance," if the variance of their unit
values is above the 75th percentile, or as \Low Variance" otherwise.
Results are displayed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 11. We report the estimates of the IV models
that use the more non-parametric instruments (year dummies times initial shares (equation 8)
and the average exchange rate (equation 10)) and that control for industry-year eects and rm
initial conditions. The results are however robust to all other specications presented above (see
online appendix). In panel A, we use log average wages as measures of skill utilization. We nd
that exporters to high-income countries pay higher wages in industries with both high and low
scope for vertical dierentiation. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, industries with a higher scope for
dierentiation pay higher wages than industries with lower dierentiation scope (the coecient of
HI is 0.344 and highly signicant in column 1, while it is 0.188 and marginally signicant in column
2). In panel B, we use instead the share of non-production workers. In this case, the impact of HI
is positive in both high- and low-variance sectors, but the estimates are imprecise. Similar results
are obtained when using Khandelwal's (2010) quality ladder length.22 The fact that high-income
exporters pay higher wages in sectors with high scope for quality dierentiation is consistent with
Verhoogen's quality valuation mechanism.
A potentially important confounding factor for the quality valuation theory is that, for
Argentina, high-income destinations such as the U.S. and the E.U. are also farther away. In
consequence, exporting to those markets incurs higher transport costs, and this increases the scope
for a shipping-the-good-apples-out argument, as in Hummels and Skiba (2004) and G org, Halpern
and Murak ozy (2010). As argued in section 2, higher (non-proportional) transport costs can make
high-priced exported goods (due to, for example, quality) relatively cheaper in high-income markets
than in neighboring markets. If so, Argentine rms will disproportionately ship higher quality
products to higher-income destinations. Furthermore, if the production of quality requires skills,
our nding of a positive impact of high-income exports on skill utilization can be due to the
shipping-the-good-apples-out argument rather than to the quality valuation argument. Note that
this interpretation still requires a quality dimension (the good apples are higher quality goods),
but the key dierence is that export destinations do not dier in terms of how they value quality.
Rather, the mechanism works via transport costs.
22Khandelwal (2010) calculates an index based on the estimation of demand equations that incorporate a valuation
for quality. We dened sectors with \long" quality ladders if his index is above the mean, and with \short" ladders
in the opposite case. A full set of results can be found in our online Appendix.
27We explore this distinction as follows. We use U.S. customs data (from the USITC website) to
construct measures of transport costs at the 3-digit ISIC codes. We use trade with Canada only in
order to keep the export destination constant. Then, we split the sample into those industries with
relatively high unitary transport costs and those with relatively low transport costs. For the cuto,
we use the 75th percentile of the 3-digit average U.S. transport costs (though results are robust to
other cutos, such as the median or the 60th percentile). We expect the \good apples" argument to
be stronger in the high transport costs industries. Results are reported in columns 3 (high transport
costs) and 4 (low transport costs) of Table 11. For the case of log wages (Panel A), we nd that
exporting to high-income destinations raises skill utilization in both high and low transport costs
industries. We also nd that the estimated coecient is larger in high transport costs industries
(0.339) than in low transport cost industries (0.200), but they are not statistically dierent. In
the case of the share of non-production workers (Panel B), we nd instead a stronger eect of HI
on skill utilization in low transport cost industries. Taken together, these results suggest that our
results do not appear to be driven by a transport-cost mechanism and thus reinforce the support
for the quality valuation argument.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 11, we further elaborate on this test with regressions only
for industries with larger scope for quality dierentiation (as previously dened). Within these
industries, we nd strong impacts of HI for both high and low transport costs industries for
the case of log wages. The estimated coecients are larger than in our previous regressions and
statistically signicant. While we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal, it is noteworthy
that the estimated coecient is larger in low than in high transport costs industries (0.476 in
column 7 and 0.571 in column 8). This result goes against the transport cost mechanism, thus
providing additional support to the quality valuation hypothesis. Note, however, that sample sizes
are reduced signicantly and thus the results become less robust. For instance, in panel B, we
nd positive impacts of HI on the share of non-production workers, but these estimates are never
statistically signicant.
Another experiment that can shed light on the mechanisms is to exploit language dierences
across destinations. A major rich-country destination for Argentina is the U.S., which has greater
linguistic distance than most of its neighbors in Latin America. In consequence, exporting
to high-income destinations may matter just because of the skills associated with language
requirements rather than because of the quality valuation|an argument close to our modied
28Matsuyama \required services" hypothesis. To explore this, we split the high-income countries
into those countries with low \language distance" (that is, countries where the main language is
Spanish, Portuguese or Italian) and those countries with high language distance (all others). The
low language distance countries are thus Spain, Portugal and Italy, while the high language distance
group includes the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, and so on. Then, we run our IV regression models
on the sample of rms that specialize in low language distance destinations (dened as rms that sell
more than 75 percent of their high-income exports to these destinations) and those that specialize
in high language distance countries.23 Results are in columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 (using the same
general specication from Table 11). Our typical nding that HI matters, while EXP does not,
survives for rms exporting to high language-distance countries (column 1). Instead, we nd that
neither EXP nor HI are statistically signicant explanatory variables for rms that specialize in
low language distance destinations (column 2). These results support the modied Matsuyama
story. Arguably, however, it is plausible that the valuation of quality in the U.S. is higher than the
valuation of quality in Spain or Portugal.
An additional related test is to investigate whether the impacts of HI and EXP on skill
utilization change when we directly control for language and cultural distance, or proximity, in the
baseline regressions (from Table 5). We build a measure of linguistic proximity with the share of
a rm's exports to countries that speak Spanish, Portuguese or Italian, but including all countries
instead of only high-income countries. We measure cultural proximity with the share of a rms'
exports destined to all other countries in South America (which are arguably culturally close to
Argentina). Results are in columns 3 and 4 of Table 12. In both cases, we nd that exporters
to high-income destinations employ higher skills (while exporting per se does not lead to higher
skill intensity) even after controlling for language or cultural proximity. Furthermore, the point
estimates in panels A and B are similar to those from the baseline models. These results strongly
support the quality upgrading mechanism. Also, note that the coecients for language/cultural
proximity, which are negative and statistically signicant, indicate that exports to \low" distance
countries are correlated with lower skill utilization, a result that is consistent with the required
services mechanism.24
23Results are robust to the cuto (for example, 75 or 80 percent) and to adding France as a language (and culture)
close destination.
24We should note, however, that to fully separate both forces in this regression would require the use of a compelling
instrument for the rms' decision to export to countries with language dierences, an instrument that we do not have.
295 Conclusions
In this paper, we elaborated upon a theory linking export destinations and skill utilization in
developing countries. We provided a unied theoretical framework to study the behavior of rms
that export to high-income countries in terms of the utilization of skilled labor. In our framework,
exporters to high-income destinations hire more skilled workers for two reasons. First, since
valuation for quality is higher in high-income countries, high-income exporters engage in quality
upgrades, which are skill-intensive. Second, there are required services associated with exporting
to high-income countries, and these activities are also intensive in skills. Our model introduces
multi-dimensional rm heterogeneity in order to explain both the decision to export as well as the
decision to export to high-income countries. This heterogeneity is due to dierences in the eciency
in the use of skilled and unskilled labor across rms.
Empirical evidence comes from a panel of Argentine manufacturing rms and matched customs
information on exports and export destinations at the rm level. The available data cover the
1998-2000 period and thus span the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, which provides a useful source
of identication of exogenous changes in exports and in export destinations to explore whether
rms choose the skill composition of their workforce based on the destination of their exports.
The empirical models consistently suggest that exporting to high-income countries induces rms
to hire more skilled workers, but exporting per se does not. The reason is that the domestic markets
in Argentina are similar to export markets in middle-income countries and thus it is only possible to
observe dierences in rm's outcomes for rms specializing in exporting to high-income countries.
We nd strong support for the quality valuation channel, and we cannot rule out the required
services argument.
Our contribution lies in identifying, empirically and theoretically, mechanisms that explain how
the \act of exporting" to dierent destinations aects the behavior of rms. Our results clarify the
nature of this behavior and, in turn, this may prove useful in current research eorts to understand
factors driving rm choices of exporting and of exporting to dierent markets.
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34Table 1
Descriptive Statistics from Firm Survey (ENI) and Customs Records
Argentina 1998-2000
All Firms Exporters High-income exporters
I II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Exported in a given year 0.59
Exported during sample period 0.68
Exports/Sales 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.22
Number of destinations 3.3 4.9 5.4 7.8
Observations 2544 1499 1307 680
Panel B
Number of workers 89.7 1:22 0:39 0:43
( 0.04 ) ( 0.07 ) (0.05)
Annual sales in 100,000 USD 8.04 1:73 0:54 0:54
( 0.05 ) ( 0.09 ) (0.06)
Average annual wage in USD 12,154 0:48 0:12 0:15
( 0.02 ) ( 0.03 ) (0.03)
Share of non-production workers 0.26 0:05 0:03 0.014
(Number of workers) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) (0.01)
Source: Own calculations based on rm data from the National Industrial Survey (ENI) and
customs records.
Panel A): Averages of variables for dierent groups of rms: all rms, exporters, high-income
exporters denition I (i.e. high-income and upper-middle-income destinations), high-income
exporters denition II (i.e. only high-income destinations).
Panel B):
Column (1): Average number of workers, average annual sales, average annual wage, average
share of non-production workers (number of non-production workers/number of non-production +
production workers).
Column (2): Dierence in means in log workers, log sales, log wage and share of non-production
workers between exporters and non-exporters, controlling for 3-digit industry and year.
Column (3): Dierence in means between rms that export to at least one high-income destination
and other exporters (conditional on exporting), controlling for 3-digit industry and year.
Column (4): Dierence in means between rms that export to at least one high-income destination
(denition II) and other exporters (conditional on exporting to high-income countries, denition I),
controlling for 3-digit industry and year.
35Table 2
Exports, Export Destinations and Skill Utilization in the Cross Section
OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Log Average Wage
Exports/Sales (EXP) 0:692   0:513
(0.110) (0.113)
High Income Exports (HI)   0:340 0:291
(0.039) (0.038)
Observations 2544 2544 2544
R-squared 0.219 0.238 0.256
Panel B: Share of non-prod Workers
Exports/Sales (EXP) 0:0410   0:010
(0.031) (0.033)
High Income Exports (HI)   0:052 0:051
(0.013) (0.013)
Observations 2544 2544 2544
R-squared 0.257 0.266 0.266
All regressions include year and 3-digit industry eects. Standard errors are clustered at
the rm level. Signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level is denoted by
***, ** and *.
36Table 3
Main Countries of Destination of Argentine Manufacturing Exports
1998 1999 2000
Value Share Value Share Value Share
Brazil 5568.5 0.36 3858.3 0.28 4363.6 0.31
United States 1550.9 0.10 1822.7 0.13 2187.1 0.15
Chile 959.8 0.06 950.4 0.07 1190.0 0.08
Uruguay 654.0 0.04 638.8 0.05 608.6 0.04
Paraguay 491.5 0.03 441.3 0.03 460.1 0.03
Europe 2025.3 0.13 2037.7 0.15 2014.8 0.14
TOTAL 15259.1 1 13716.0 1 14155.9 1
High Income I 6512.3 0.43 6840.5 0.50 7265.8 0.51
High Income II 4237.3 0.28 4624.7 0.34 4872.3 0.34
Source: UN COMTRADE. Manufacturing sector only. Values in constant 1998 millions of
dollars.
High Income I: countries classied by the World Bank as high income and upper middle
income.
High Income II: countries classied by the World Bank as high income.
37Table 4
Export Shares: Matched Firm-Customs Data
Brazil High Income
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
Weighted Average(1) 0.37 0.32 0.35 0.49 0.58 0.54
Average exporters(2) 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.49 0.54 0.55
Average all rms(3) 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.29 0.31 0.33
Small rms 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.11
Medium-sized rms 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.24 0.27 0.28
Large rms 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.40 0.43 0.47
Food and beverages 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.30 0.30 0.30
Textiles 0.19 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.40 0.33
Apparel 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.05
Leather and leather products 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.37 0.29 0.32
Wood, cork and straw products 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.13
Paper and paper products 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.31 0.39 0.48
Publishing, printing, media 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.20 0.19
Coke and rened petroleum products 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.31 0.30
Chemicals and chemical products 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.37 0.39 0.40
Rubber and plastics products 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.30 0.34
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.32 0.31 0.35
Basic metals 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.31 0.38 0.43
Metal products 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.33
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.38 0.37 0.40
Electrical machinery 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.22
Radio, TV and communication equipment 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.24 0.35 0.37
Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.56 0.42 0.52
Motor vehicles 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.19 0.22 0.24
Other transport equipment 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.30 0.31 0.30
Furniture; Other 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.32 0.32 0.35
Source: customs data. Table shows the participation of Brazil (rst three columns) and High Income
destinations (last three columns) in total exports. High Income destinations group countries classied
by the World Bank as high income and upper-middle income. (1) Average share weighted by rm
participation in total exports. (2) Unweighted average share among exporters. (3) Unweighted average
share among all rms.
38Table 5
Exports, Export Destinations, and Skills. Wage Regressions
Dummy Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Second Stage
High Income Exports (HI) 0.277*** 0.343*** 0.267*** 0.284*** 0.260*** 0.009 0.053*
(0.097) (0.119) (0.092) (0.089) (0.092) (0.020) (0.030)
Exports/Sales (EXP) -0.186 -0.029 0.052 0.09 0.101 -0.040 -0.104
(0.462) (0.446) (0.456) (0.451) (0.459) (0.092) (0.130)
Log Sales | | | | 0.056** 0.063** 0.076**
(0.022) (0.026) (0.036)
Panel B1: First Stage (HI)
Share BRA exports * 1999 0.213*** 0.222*** 0.313*** 0.338*** 0.313*** | |
(0.036) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Share BRA exports * 2000 0.241*** 0.268*** 0.395*** 0.356*** 0.395*** | |
(0.039) (0.045) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051)
Average Exchange Rate 0.986*** 0.975*** 0.656* 0.787** 0.670* | |
(0.302) (0.346) (0.350) (0.344) (0.350)
Log Sales | | | | 0.022 | |
(0.017)
R-squared 0.034 0.106 0.158 0.147 0.159
p-value 0 4.18e-09 0 0 0
Panel B2: First Stage (EXP)
Share BRA exports * 1999 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.016 | |
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Share BRA exports * 2000 0.037*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.034** 0.032** | |
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Average Exchange Rate 0.600*** 0.808*** 0.804*** 0.800*** 0.806*** | |
(0.229) (0.227) (0.229) (0.228) (0.229)
Log Sales | | | | 0.004 | |
(0.009)
R-squared 0.029 0.159 0.161 0.161 0.161 | |
p-value 0.001 0.0003 0.0016 0.0006 0.0016
Industry*Year | Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Year | | Yes | Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Erate | | | Yes | | |
Number of Firms 901 901 901 901 901 901 901
Observations 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544 1,683
Columns (1)-(5): IV-FE regressions. Columns (6)-(7): OLS-FE regressions. Dependent variable in second stage: Log
Average Wage (Panel A). Dependent variables in rst stage: Exports to high income destinations over total value of exports
(HI) in Panel B1; and Total value of exports over Total value of sales (EXP) in Panel B2. All regressions include rm xed
eects. Industry eects are dened at the 3-digit level. Initial conditions are Log Sales in 1998 and an indicator variable
for exporting status in 1998. Dummy instruments (IHI1) and the weighted average exchange rate (IEXP) are used in all
regressions. Bootstrapped SE clustered at the rm level in parenthesis. Signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10
percent level is denoted by ***, ** and *.
39Table 6
Exports, Export Destinations, and Skills. Wage Regressions
Exchange Rate Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Second Stage
High Income Exports (HI) 0.270** 0.331*** 0.278*** 0.275*** 0.272***
(0.109) (0.124) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091)
Exports/Sales (EXP) -0.258 -0.065 0.085 0.033 0.137
(0.604) (0.477) (0.490) (0.488) (0.469)
Log Sales | | | | 0.056**
(0.022)
Panel B1: First Stage (HI)
Share BRA exports * erate 0.364*** 0.393*** 0.569*** 0.576*** 0.568***
(0.0577) (0.0665) (0.0745) (0.0744) (0.0743)
Average Exchange Rate 0.814*** 0.843** 0.529 0.657* 0.544
(0.287) (0.340) (0.346) (0.338) (0.346)
Log Sales | | | | 0.0224
(0.0171)
R-squared 0.031 0.102 0.150 0.143 0.151
p-value 0 5.77e-09 0 0 0
Panel B2: First Stage (EXP)
Share BRA exports * erate 0.0281 0.0286 0.0352* 0.0337 0.0350*
(0.0189) (0.0183) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0206)
Average Exchange Rate 0.534** 0.775*** 0.787*** 0.767*** 0.790***
(0.225) (0.226) (0.228) (0.226) (0.228)
Log Sales | | | | 0.00404
(0.00892)
R-squared 0.020 0.155 0.159 0.157 0.159
p-value 0.0591 0.0028 0.0026 0.0031 0.0025
Industry*Year Eects | Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Year Eects | | Yes | Yes
Initial Conditions*Exchange Rate | | | Yes |
Number of Firms 901 901 901 901 901
Observations 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544
Dependent variable in second stage: Log Average Wage (Panel A). Dependent variables in rst stage:
Exports to high income destinations over total value of exports (HI) in Panel B1; and Total value of exports
over total value of sales (EXP) in Panel B2. All regressions include rm xed eects. Industry eects are
dened at the 3-digit level. Initial conditions are Log Sales in 1998 and an indicator variable for exporting
status in 1998. Exchange rate instruments (IHI2 and IEXP) are used in all regressions. Bootstrapped SE
clustered at the rm level in parenthesis. Signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level is
denoted by ***, ** and *.
40Table 7
Exports, Export Destinations, and Skills. Share of Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Dummy Instruments
High Income Exports (HI) 0.174*** 0.146*** 0.078** 0.088*** 0.079**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Exports/Sales (EXP) -0.109 0.055 0.177 0.169 0.172
(0.145) (0.144) (0.159) (0.161) (0.159)
Log Sales | | | | -0.006
(0.007)
Panel B: Exchange Rate Instruments
High Income Exports (HI) 0.177*** 0.156*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.092***
(0.043) (0.047) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Exports/Sales (EXP) -0.078 0.082 0.216 0.182 0.209
(0.190) (0.167) (0.184) (0.180) (0.185)
Log Sales | | | | -0.007
(0.007)
Industry*Year Eects | Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Year Eects | | Yes | Yes
Initial Conditions*Exchange Rate | | | Yes |
Number of Firms 901 901 901 901 901
Observations 2544 2544 2544 2544 2544
Dependent variable: number of non-production workers over total number of workers. All regressions include rm xed
eects. Industry eects are dened at the 3-digit level. Initial conditions are Log Sales in 1998 and an indicator variable
for exporting status in 1998. Dummy instruments (IHI1 and IEXP) are used in all regressions in Panel A. Exchange
rate instruments (IHI2 and IEXP) are used in all regressions in Panel B. First stage regressions are the same as in
Table 5 for Panel A and Table 6 for Panel B. Bootstrapped SE clustered at the rm level in parenthesis. Signicance
at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, ** and *.
41Table 8
Alternative Denition of High Income Exports
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Log Average Wage
High Income Exports II (HI) 0.803** 0.843*** 0.781**
(0.315) (0.297) (0.314)
Exports/Sales (EXP) -0.092 -0.044 -0.035
(0.480) (0.478) (0.483)
Log Sales | | 0.060***
(0.023)
Panel B: Share of non-prod Workers
High Income Exports II (HI) 0.238** 0.260*** 0.240**
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100)
Exports/Sales (EXP) 0.135 0.128 0.13
(0.155) (0.157) (0.157)
Log Sales | | -0.005
(0.007)
Industry*Year Eects Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Year Eects Yes | Yes
Initial Conditions*Exchange Rate | Yes |
Number of Firms 901 901 901
Observations 2544 2544 2544
High Income Exports II is dened as the share of total value of exports that is shipped
to countries classied by the World Bank as high income (it excludes upper-middle
income countries). Dependent variables: Log average wage in Panel A; Number of
non-production workers over total number of workers in Panel B. All regressions include
rm xed eects. Dummy instruments are used in all regressions. Bootstrapped SE
clustered at the rm level in parenthesis. Signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wage Regressions Controlling for Share of Non-Production Workers.
(1) (2) (3)
High Income Exports (HI) 0.227** 0.240*** 0.219**
(0.091) (0.090) (0.086)
Exports/Sales (EXP) -0.037 0.005 0.013
(0.453) (0.458) (0.455)
Share of non-prod Workers 0.505*** 0.505*** 0.510***
(0.084) (0.086) (0.082)
Log Sales | | 0.060***
(0.021)
Industry*Year Eects Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Year Eects Yes | Yes
Initial Conditions*Exchange Rate | Yes |
Number of Firms 901 901 901
Observations 2544 2544 2544
Dependent variable: Log average wage. All regressions include rm xed eects.
Dummy instruments are used in all regressions. Bootstrapped SE clustered at the
rm level in parenthesis. Signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent
level is denoted by ***, ** and *.
44Table 11
Channels: Quality Valuation
Scope for Dierentiation Transport Costs Transport Costs +
Scope for Dierentiation
High Low High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Log Average Wage
High Income Exports (HI) 0.344** 0.188* 0.339** 0.200* 0.476** 0.571**
(0.137) (0.104) (0.137) (0.111) (0.196) (0.269)
Exports/Sales (EXP) 0.272 0.100 0.999 -0.236 5.412 -0.434
(0.980) (0.310) (1.279) (0.499) (3.795) (0.978)
Log Sales 0.043 0.063* 0.087** 0.049* 0.132* -0.004
(0.033) (0.033) (0.044) (0.029) (0.070) (0.039)
B: Share of non-prod Workers
High Income Exports (HI) 0.045 0.091 0.027 0.117** 0.038 0.102
(0.050) (0.059) (0.058) (0.048) (0.078) (0.101)
Exports/Sales (EXP) 0.444 0.027 0.131 0.209 0.596 0.242
(0.348) (0.140) (0.278) (0.203) (1.465) (0.432)
Log Sales -0.004 -0.006 0.002 -0.01 0.013 -0.018
(0.014) (0.008) (0.018) (0.007) (0.029) (0.013)
Industry*Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 344 536 313 611 149 195
Observations 973 1506 892 1717 430 543
Columns (1)-(2)|Scope for vertical dierentiation: 3-digit ISIC industries are split according to variance in export unit values computed
from all bilateral transactions in COMTRADE data (High: above the 75th percentile). Columns (3)-(4)|Transport costs: industries are
split according to unitary transports costs (High: above 75th percentile). Columns (5)-(6)|Transport costs + Vertical dierentiation:
industries with high scope for vertical dierentiation are split into High and Low transport costs. Dependent variable: Log average
wage (Panel A) and Share of non-production workers (Panel B). All regressions include rm xed eects. Dummy instruments are used
in all regressions. Bootstrapped SE clustered at the rm level in parenthesis. Signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent
level is denoted by ***, ** and *.
45Table 12
Channels: High-Income Exports and Linguistic and Cultural Distance
Split Regression Controlling for
High-Income Countries Language Cultural
High LD Low LD Proximity Proximity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Log Average Wage
High Income Exports (HI) 0.327*** 0.063 0.237*** 0.239***
(0.111) (0.207) (0.080) (0.080)
Exports/Sales (EXP) 0.014 0.548 -0.039 0.015
(0.564) (0.464) (0.456) (0.465)
Log Sales 0.054** 0.062** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022)
Language/Cultural -0.079** -0.055**
Proximity (0.033) (0.026)
B: Share of non-prod Workers
High Income Exports (HI) 0.109** 0.149 0.074*** 0.078***
(0.043) (0.133) (0.029) (0.029)
Exports/Sales (EXP) 0.186 0.280 0.138 0.163
(0.207) (0.227) (0.155) 0.156)
Log Sales -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Language/Cultural -0.020* -0.006
Proximity (0.011) (0.011)
Industry*Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Initial Conditions*Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 838 585 901 901
Observations 2341 1440 2544 2544
Columns (1)-(2)|Split regression and language distance: rms are split according to the language spoken
in their high-income destination markets (Low LD: above 75% of high-income exports destined for Spain,
Portugal or Italy). Dependent variable: Log average wage (Panel A) and Share of non-production workers
(Panel B). All regressions include rm xed eects. Dummy instruments are used in all regressions.
Bootstrapped SE clustered at the rm level in parenthesis.
Column (3): baseline regression controlling for language proximity, measured as the share of a rm's
exports to low and high-income destinations where the main language is Spanish, Portuguese or Italian.
Column (4): baseline regression controlling for cultural proximity, measured as the share of a rm's
exports to South American countries.
Signicance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, ** and *.
46